The Economics of Exceptionalism: The US and the International Criminal Court
Issue: Vol 24 No. 2 (2016)
Journal: Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism
Subject Areas: Philosophy
This article is a response to a call for a study of international criminal law as an economic phenomenon, going beyond addressing administrability, commensurability, and interpersonal comparison of utility, band instead focusing on problems of institutional choice. This approach differs from the typical methods of normative and descriptive scholarship of international criminal law. An institution like the International Criminal Court (ICC) can be usefully examined as an international public good, and as such offering little incentives for states such as the United States of America to join as they can enjoy benefits without costs. This article examines the economic basis for the US non-participation in the ICC and grapples with future prospectives.
Author: Tiphaine Dickson
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