Blurb:

Context, when used as a technical term in human sciences, is neither transparent
nor self-evident in its contribution to theory. The introduction of the notion, as
a necessary level of semantic description, came out of the general movement
1890–1920 that placed the scientific study of human cultures alongside other
sciences. The necessity of context became apparent to Malinowski and others,
when such early anthropologists confronted the non-transferability of crucial
meanings across cultures, despite the supposedly universal conditions under
which human beings lived. The assumption of ‘simplicity’ amongst ‘savage
races’ was also contested as the non-equivalences in translation drew researchers
on into more delicate distinctions and connections within the community
under investigation. Researchers need to judge the form and direction of current proposals on context
in the light provided by theoretical notions drawn from complexity theory,
fuzzy sets, probabilistic modelling, corpus linguistics, evolutionary theory and
functionalism (when broadly and historically interpreted). We believe that the
evidence of Malinowski’s own context (from Boltzmann to Russell; from Boas
to Wittgenstein; from Darwin to Frazer) suggests that nothing of this list would
have surprised or daunted him. His own assiduous habits of observation and
note taking demonstrated his commitment to grounding theory in the ‘typicalactual’
of human activities. But, we argue, the concepts of Malinowski and of
J. R. Firth only become powerful, abstract tools with Halliday’s theorisation
of semiotic dimensions; with his distinction of use, function and metafunction;
with his mapping of systems in relational networks; and with his elaboration
of relations between text, context and register.